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Abstract—Recent research has illustrated privacy breaches
that can be effected on an anonymized dataset by an attacker
who has access to auxiliary information about the users. Most
of these attack strategies rely on the uniqueness of specific
aspects of the users’ data - e.g., observing a mobile user at just
a few points on the time-location space are sufficient to uniquely
identify him/her from an anonymized set of users. In this work,
we consider de-anonymization attacks on anonymized summary
statistics in the form of histograms. Such summary statistics are
useful for many applications that do not need knowledge about
exact user behavior. We consider an attacker who has access
to an anonymized set of histograms of K users’ data and an
independent set of data belonging to the same users. Modeling
the users’ data as i.i.d., we study the composite hypothesis
testing problem of identifying the correct matching between
the anonymized histograms from the first set and the user data
from the second. We propose a Generalized Likelihood Ratio
Test as a solution to this problem and show that the solution
can be identified using a minimum weight matching algorithm
on an K×K complete bipartite weighted graph. We show that
a variant of this solution is asymptotically optimal as the data
lengths are increased. We apply the algorithm on mobility traces
of over 1000 users on EPFL campus collected during two weeks
and show that up to 70% of the users can be correctly matched.
These results show that anonymized summary statistics of
mobility traces themselves contain a significant amount of
information that can be used to uniquely identify users by
an attacker who has access to auxiliary information about the
statistics.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many datasets containing information
about individuals have been released into public domain in
order to provide open access to statistics or to facilitate
data mining research. Often these databases are anonymized
by suppressing identifiers that reveal the identities of the
users, like names or social security numbers. Nevertheless,
recent research has revealed that the privacy offered by
such anonymized databases may be compromised, if an
adversary correlates the revealed information with publicly
available databases. For instance, in [1] it was shown that
anonymous movie ratings released during the Netflix Prize
context could be de-anonymized using public user reviews
from the Internet Movie Database (IMDB), and more re-
cently, in [2] it was shown that users can be uniquely
identified from a database of mobility traces collected at
coarse spatio-temporal resolutions. In most works of this
kind, the vulnerability to privacy breaches often arises due
to the sparsity of the temporal evolution of the user’s data.
For instance, the fact that a user watched a movie during
a particular time-period or the fact that a user was at a
specific location during a particular time can be used to easily
identify the user’s data from the anonymized dataset.
A potential approach to counter such attacks is to reveal
only statistics of the data belonging to each user in the
anonymized database. For instance, in the case of mobility
traces of users, the summary statistics could be the average
time spent by each user in the different locations during
a day (or during a different time duration). Similarly, for
web-browsing histories, the summary statistics would be the
average time spent by each user on different websites. Such
summary statistics are sufficient for some applications such
as estimating ‘popularity’ of different locations or websites.
In this work, we study de-anonymization attacks on such
summary statistics, by an adversary who has access to
independent auxiliary information about the users, in the
form of datasets or statistics.
Since temporal information is not available, we adopt an
i.i.d. model for the temporal evolution of each user’s data.
We assume that the empirical frequency (or histogram) of the
data of each user is released in an anonymized fashion. We
consider an adversary who has access to a non-anonymized
version of the data of the users collected in an independent
experiment. We then study the problem of matching the sets
of anonymized and non-anonymized data under the i.i.d.
model. This problem is closely related to a classification
problem studied by Gutman in [3]. In Gutman’s problem,
labeled training strings are available from K i.i.d. sources
having unknown underlying probability distributions, and the
objective is to use this information to classify an unlabeled
independently drawn test string to the correct source. The
current problem is very similar, except that we now have
K unlabeled test strings, one from each source, and the
objective is to match all K of them to the correct training
string. The current problem and Gutman’s problem can be
considered to be extreme cases of a more general problem
in which some L ≤ K unlabeled test strings are available
in addition to the K labeled training strings. In this paper
we stick to the case where L = K . We show that an
asymptotically optimal procedure for correctly matching the
K sources can be derived by following steps similar to that
in [3]. The solution is given by a minimum weight matching
problem on a bipartite graph and hence can be efficiently
implemented.
The privacy literature contains various approaches for
using auxiliary information to de-anonymize datasets. For
example in [1] the Netflix dataset was de-anonymized using
user reviews from IMDB and in [4] medical records were
de-anonymized with the help of external auxiliary infor-
mation, namely, ZIP code, birth date, and gender. The de-
anonymization of mobility traces was investigated in the
works of [5]–[10]. These techniques take into account the
temporal information available in the traces. For example,
in [8], [9], a Markov model is constructed based on the
mobility behaviors of the users, and then similarity measures
based on heuristics were used for de-anonymization. In [11]
the authors build a contact graph of the users using the
spatial and temporal information available in the traces, and
then de-anonymize the users by correlating this graph with
a social network. Our work differs from these related works
in the fact that we assume that only anonymized statistics,
e.g., anonymized histograms, of the users’s data are available.
For instance, in the case of location data, we assume that
we know only the average time spent by the users in
various locations, i.e., the histograms, and not the exact
temporal information, as required by most existing methods.
In addition, we assume that the information available in
the dataset to be de-anonymized is independent from the
auxiliary information. Our notion of independence will be
clear in the next section where we present the problem state-
ment. One example of independent information is the case
where the dataset and the auxiliary information comprise of
users’ mobility traces that belong to two non-overlapping
time periods. We remark that in the related works of [2],
[6], the auxiliary information is a subset of the information
in the dataset to be de-anonymized and hence the two are
not independent. For example, the auxiliary information is
some portions of anonymized users’ trajectories where the
identities of the users are known.
In this work, we formalize the notion of optimal de-
anonymization strategies for such data and identify the cor-
rect similarity metric between independent instances of the
users’ data that leads to an asymptotically optimal solution to
the de-anonymization task. We apply our solution to Wi-Fi
traces obtained from a university campus and demonstrate
that using only temporal statistics of users’ mobility, we
can de-anonymize more than half of the users in a dataset
containing more than a thousand users. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. After introducing our notation,
we state the problem in mathematical form in section II.
We propose our solution and its optimality properties in
Section III, and experimentally evaluate it in Section IV. We
conclude in Section V.
Notation: For a finite alphabet Z, we use P(Z) to denote
the set of all probability distributions defined on Z. For any
string s ∈ Zn, we use Γs ∈ P(Z) to denote the empirical
distribution of the string defined as
Γs(z) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
I{si = z}, z ∈ Z.
Further we use Ts to denote the type class of s, i.e., the set
of all strings of length n with the same empirical distribution
as s. Throughout the paper we use log to refer to logarithm
to the base 2.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a set K of K sources each producing i.i.d.
data according to distinct but unknown distributions on Z.
Consider a set S1 = {x1, x2, . . . , xK} of unlabeled strings
of length n each generated by a distinct source in K, and
an independent set S2 = {y1, y2, . . . , yL} of labeled strings
of length n each generated by a distinct source within a
subset of K of size L. Here S1 represents the user data
whose unlabeled (i.e., anonymized) statistics are released
in public and S2 represents auxiliary information about the
users that is obtained by an adversary. The information S2 is
assumed to be independent of S1. In the case of data such as
mobility patterns or web-browsing history, the information
in S2 could be collected, for instance, by tracking the
users. Alternatively, it may be the case that the adversary is
some network service provider (e.g., location based service
provider or internet service provider) who has access to the
user’s locations or web-browsing history which contain S2.
Let k denote the source that generated string xpi(k) ∈ Z
n and
yk ∈ Z
n where pi : {1, 2, . . . , L} 7→ {1, 2, . . . ,K} is some
unknown injective (one-to-one) function. When L = K , the
function pi is just some unknown permutation. Let pk denote
a probability measure on Z that captures the probability
law followed by data from source k. The de-anonymization
problem that the adversary needs to solve, is to match each
string from set S2 to the string from S1 produced by the
corresponding source. Equivalently, the adversary seeks to
estimate pi. The special case of this estimation problem when
L = 1 was studied by Gutman [3]. In the present paper,
we study the other extreme case of L = K . Since the
observations from each source are assumed to be i.i.d., we
will show later (see Lemma 3.2) that the optimal testing
procedure requires only the types, or empirical distributions,
of the strings {xi} and {yj}. Thus only the types of the
strings are used while performing the matching, as required
in the de-anonymization problem.
We view this as a hypothesis testing problem with M =
K! composite hypotheses. Each hypothesis corresponds to
a unique permutation of {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Let pi1, pi2, . . . , piM
denote the M possible permutations of {1, 2, . . . ,K}. The
hypothesis Hi corresponds to a particular permutation pii.
The hypotheses are all composite because the probability
distributions of each user’s data could lie anywhere in
P(Z). We seek a decision rule for this problem that admits
exponential decay of error probability as a function of n
under each hypothesis. For this purpose, we allow a no-
match decision, i.e., rejection of allM hypotheses. Following
an approach similar to that in [3] we denote a decision
rule for the M -hypotheses problem by a partition Ω =
(Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,ΩM ,ΩR) of Z = (Z
n)K × (Zn)K the space
of vectors of the form x1, x2, . . . , xK , y1, y2, . . . , yK , into
(M +1) disjoint cells Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,ΩM ,ΩR, where Ωi is the
acceptance region for hypothesis Hi, and ΩR = Z−∪
M
i=1Ωi
is the rejection zone. We consider an error event e under
hypothesis Hi to denote a decision in favor of a wrong
hypothesis Hj where j 6= i. Note that a decision in favor
of rejection does not correspond to an error event under any
hypothesis. Thus the probability of error of the decision rule
Ω under hypothesis Hi is
PΩ(e/Hi) = PHi

(x, y) ∈
M⋃
j=1
j 6=i
Ωj

 (1)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xK), and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yK). We
consider a generalized Neyman-Pearson criterion wherein we
seek to ensure that all error probabilities decay exponentially
in n with some predetermined slope λ, and simultaneously
minimize the rejection probability subject to these con-
straints. Specifically, we seek optimal decisions rules Ω such
that ∀p1, p2, . . . pK ∈ P(Z)
lim
n→∞
1
n
logPΩ(e/Hi) ≤ −λ, i = 1, . . . ,M, (2)
and ΩR is minimal.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The problem of matching strings across two sets can be
best visualized as a matching problem on a bipartite graph.
Let G = (V,E) denote a complete bipartite graph where
each vertex in the set V of vertices denotes a unique element
in S1 ∪ S2. There exists an edge from each element i in S1
to each element j in S2 and no edges between elements
in S1 or S2. Thus we have a complete bipartite graph
where S1 and S2 form the two parts. Corresponding to the
M = K! different hypothesis, there are M possible maximal
matchings on G. A matching is a subset S of edges E of
G such that no two edges in S share a vertex. A maximal
matching is a matching S such that no edge from G can
be added to S while preserving the matching property. The
matching corresponding to Hk is the maximal matching in
which node i from S2 is mapped to node pik(i) in S1. The
hypothesis testing task thus is equivalent to identifying the
correct maximal matching.
A commonly used solution for universal and composite
hypothesis testing problems is the generalized likelihood
ratio test (GLRT). The first step for obtaining a GLRT
solution is to maximize the log-likelihood function of the
observations from all distributions under each hypothesis.
For hypothesis Hi this is given by
L(Hi) = sup
p1,p2,...,pK
K∑
k=1
[
log pk(xpii(k)) + log pk(yk)
]
= −2n
K∑
k=1
[
H(Γxpii(k)) +H(Γyk)
D(Γxpii(k)‖
1
2 (Γxpii(k) + Γyk))
+D(Γyk‖
1
2 (Γxpii(k) + Γyk))
]
(3)
where the second relation follows by noting that the
original expression is maximized by choosing pk =
1
2 (Γxpii(k) + Γyk). Here H(p) denotes the entropy of distri-
bution p. A good solution to the multiple hypothesis testing
problem in practice is to decide in favor of the maximum-
likelihood (ML) solution1 given by
Ĥ = argmax
Hi
L(Hi) (4)
or equivalently,
Ĥ = argmin
Hi
D(Hi) (5)
where
D(Hi) =
K∑
k=1
D(Γxpii(k)‖
1
2 (Γxpii(k) + Γyk))
+D(Γyk‖
1
2 (Γxpii(k) + Γyk)). (6)
This test can be interpreted as a minimum weight matching
[12] on the complete bipartite graph G with appropriate
weights assigned to the edges in E. For i ∈ S1 and j ∈ S2
let the weight wij of edge eij between them be given by
wij = D(Γxi‖
1
2 (Γxi + Γyj)) +D(Γyj‖
1
2 (Γxi + Γyj )). (7)
Weight wij can be interpreted as a distance measure between
strings xi and yj . The following proposition summarizes this
result.
Proposition 3.1: The solution to (4) is given by the hy-
pothesis corresponding to the permutation defined by the
minimum weight matching on the bipartite graph G de-
scribed above with weights given by (7) (refer to Figure 1).
⊓⊔
x1
x2
y1
y2
xK yK
w11
Set S1 Set S2
Fig. 1. The solution to the mutiple hypothesis testing problem given in (4)
can be obtained by performing a minimum weight bipartite matching with
weights given in (7).
The solution of (4) can be justified by the asymptotic
optimality properties of a threshold test that uses this statistic.
For proving asymptotic optimality we restrict ourselves to
tests that are based only on the empirical distributions of the
observations. For this purpose, we use ΓXY to denote the
collection of empirical distributions:
ΓXY := (Γx1 ,Γx2 , . . . ,ΓxK ,Γy1 ,Γy2 , . . . ,ΓyK ) .
This is justified in the asymptotic setting because of the
following lemma.
1To be precise, this should be a maximum generalized likelihood solution
because the data distributions p1, p2, . . . , pK are unknown.
Lemma 3.2: Let Ω = (Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,ΩM ,ΩR) be a deci-
sion rule based only on the sequences {x1, x2, . . . , xK} and
{y1, y2, . . . , yK}. Then there exists a decision rule Λ =
(Λ1,Λ2, . . . ,ΛM ,ΛR) based on the sufficient statistics ΓXY
such that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logPΛ(e/Hi) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logPΩ(e/Hi),
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M, ∀p1, p2, . . . pK ∈ P(Z) (8)
and
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |ΛR| ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |ΩR|. (9)
⊓⊔
We provide a proof in the appendix. Note that ΛR and ΩR
are finite sets, thus their cardinality is well-defined.
In order to prove optimality, we allow for a no-match zone,
i.e., we allow a decision in favor of rejecting all the M
hypotheses. For this purpose, we need to identify the second
most likely hypothesis. Let
H˜ = argmin
Hi 6=Ĥ
D(Hi) (10)
where Ĥ is defined in (5). The optimal test with rejection is
described in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3: Let Ω = (Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,ΩM ,ΩR) be a de-
cision rule based on the collection ΓXY of empirical
distributions such that for all collections of distributions
p1, p2, . . . , pK from P(Z) we have
PΩ(e/Hi) ≤ 2
−λn, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M (11)
when source k is distributed according to pk for k ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,K}.
Let λ˜ = λ− 2K|Z| log(n+1)
n
,
Λi = {ΓXY : D(H˜) ≥ λ˜, Ĥ = Hi}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M,
and
ΛR = {ΓXY : D(H˜) < λ˜}.
Then
lim
n→∞
1
n
logPΛ(e/Hi) ≤ −λ,
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M, ∀p1, p2, . . . pK ∈ P(Z) (12)
and
ΛR ⊂ ΩR. (13)
⊓⊔
We provide a proof to the theorem in the appendix.
The difference in the solution given by Theorem 3.3 and
that proposed in (5) only arises due to the rejection region.
As seen in the statement of the theorem, the no-match
decision is made if the second most likely solution also has
high likelihood. Due to this rejection region, we can now
guarantee exponential decay of the error probabilities with a
given exponent under the various hypotheses. Nevertheless,
the optimality property of the solution given by Theorem 3.3
suggests that the ML estimate of (5) is a reasonable choice
even if we do not permit a no-match decision.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We applied the ML test proposed in (5) to mobility traces
obtained from connections to Wi-Fi access points on the
E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL) campus.
In this experiment the datasets in S1 and S2 correspond to
the users’ mobility traces measured over two different non-
overlapping time periods. Using only the frequency of visits
of the various users to various access points in each time-
period we show that users’ mobility traces in S1 can be
matched to those in S2 with high accuracy.
A. Dataset Description and Preprocessing
The EPFL campus consists of several buildings and hun-
dreds of wireless access points (APs) (refer to Figure 2).
The main wireless network on the campus requires authen-
tication, and can thus be accessed only by members of the
university (students, faculty, etc.). The history of connections
of every device to the network is recorded in the following
way: Whenever a device (user) connects to the network, its
(anonymized) MAC address, the ID of the AP to which it
connects, and the time of start of the connection measured to
a precision of one second, are stored in a log file. When the
device moves across the campus and gets connected to a new
AP, the time of this new connection and the ID of the AP are
similarly stored. However, if a device loses its connection
or disconnects, it is not recorded in the log file, unless it
reconnects to one of the APs. For our experiments we used
the information available in the log file of all such accesses
for two consecutive weeks during the academic semester. For
privacy reasons, all the MAC addresses inside the log file are
encrypted, however the encryption key is the same for the
two weeks period, and thus it is possible to recognize a MAC
address across different days.
Fig. 2. The position of wireless access points on the EPFL campus.
The campus has several buildings and around one thousand wireless access
points.
For obtaining the ground truth for our statistics-matching
experiments, we estimated the trajectories of all the users on
the campus by using the log file. There are two main sources
of error: First, all the wireless devices (laptops, smart-phones,
etc.), connected at any time to the network, appear in the
log file; therefore, if a user does not connect his device to
the network, or does not carry the device everywhere he
goes, his true trajectory cannot be reconstructed. Second,
whenever a user leaves the campus (disconnects), the time of
disconnection is unknown. For reconstructing the trajectories,
we assumed that a device remains connected to the same AP
until the time when it is connected to a new AP (based on the
log file entries). When a device is connected to an AP, it stays
in the communication range of the AP (typically 50-100 m),
specifically, in the AP’s vicinity. Thus the reconstructed
trajectories of the users have a spatial resolution equal to
the coverage region of an AP level of granularity. Further,
since the connections to APs are monitored every second, the
time resolution is equal to one second. In other words, the
user trajectories are reconstructed as a sequence of spatial
locations sampled every second. We use these sequence of
reconstructed user locations as the data vectors x.’s and y.’s
in our experiments. Although the reconstructed trajectories
are affected by the above mentioned sources of error, they
are reconstructed based on actual wireless connection logs.
B. Experiment One
For our first experiment, we considered all users who
are on the campus during the interval 9h00–17h00 on both
Mondays during the two weeks period. There are K =
1154 such users. For simplicity of exposition let the true
matching pi be the identity permutation. Then trajectory
of a user i in the first Monday and the second Monday
can be seen as strings xi and yi, respectively, with length
n = (17h00− 9h00) × 3600 = 28800. The alphabet Z
consists of the set of APs and |Z| = 934. The mean, median,
maximum, and standard deviation of the number of visited
APs by the users during a Monday are equal to 11, 8, 60,
and 10.4, respectively. As in Section II we assumed that
for a user i, elements of strings xi and yi are drawn in
an i.i.d. manner from an unknown underlying distribution,
which is specific to user i. Sets S1 and S2 consist of the
strings of all the users in the first Monday and the second
Monday, respectively. The empirical distributions Γxi and
Γyi are equal to the proportion of time that a user i spent in
different APs in the first Monday and the second Monday,
respectively.
After computing Γxi and Γyi for every user i, we con-
structed a complete bipartite graph described in Section III
with edge weights given in (7), and computed a mini-
mum weight matching on the graph. The obtained results
are shown in Table I under “Matching K users”. There
are 610 out of 1154 users correctly matched which gives
52.9% accuracy. We observe that although the underlying
i.i.d. assumption of users’ position at every second of their
trajectory is inherently false, the obtained accuracy is high
considering the large number of users. This means that given
the anonymized proportions of time that 1154 users spend
between 9h00–17h00 in different APs across campus on
two consecutive Mondays, we are able to correctly match
(de-anonymize) more than half of them. Or from a privacy
perspective, given anonymized temporal averages of all these
users on one Monday, the identities of more than half of these
users can be identified by tracking these users on a different
Monday.
Days
included
in dataset
# users
(K)
Matching K users in
second week
Matching 1
random user in
second week
#
correct
matches
Accuracy Fraction of
correct matches
Mondays
1154 610 52.9% 44.5%
2174 934 43.0% 32.9%
Mondays
and
Tuesdays
1047 738 70.5% 53.5%
TABLE I
RESULTS OF DE-ANONYMIZATION EXPERIMENTS. NOTE THAT (I)
INCREASING THE NUMBER OF USERS IN AN EXPERIMENT LEADS TO A
REDUCTION IN THE ACCURACY OF THE MATCHING, AND (II) MATCHING
INFORMATION ABOUT ALL USERS IN THE SECOND WEEK GIVES
STRICTLY BETTER ACCURACY THAN THAT OBTAINED WHEN MATCHING
ONLY ONE USER.
We repeated the above experiment by considering all
users who were on campus during the interval 10h00–17h00
on both Mondays during the two weeks period. As this
interval is smaller, the string length is lower, equal to n =
(17h00− 10h00)× 3600 = 25200, and there are more users
on campus; namely, K = 2174 users. The obtained results
are shown in Table I. There are 934 users correctly matched
out of a total of 2174 users which gives 43.0% accuracy.
As there are many more users and the number of samples
n is smaller, there is less information available for finding
the correct matching and thus the obtained accuracy is lower
than that in the previous experiment.
C. Experiment Two
In our second experiment, we investigated whether the
matching accuracy can be improved by using statistics of
users from two different days of the week. We considered
all users who are on campus during the interval 10h00–17h00
on both Mondays and both Tuesdays during the two weeks
period. There are K = 1047 such users. The trajectory of
every user in each day can be seen as a string with length
n = (17h00− 10h00) × 3600 = 25200. For each user we
computed four different empirical distributions associated
with the four strings. We observed that combining the traces
of each user from Monday and Tuesday to form a single long
trace leads to poor matching accuracy - we obtain only 14.0%
accuracy. The reason for this is that users have different time
tables for different days of the week, and hence by combining
different days of the week the users tend to be less distinct.
For this reason, in the experiment we assumed that each user
has different distributions for different days of the week, and
sought a method to match across weeks using the statistics
of both Monday and Tuesday. Since we have statistics of
two days on two weeks for each user, this problem does
not fit the exact structure of that studied in Section II and
hence we used a modification of the decision obtained in
Section III. We constructed a complete bipartite graph whose
edge weights are equal to the summation of weights in (7)
corresponding to the two Mondays and to the two Tuesdays.
After computing a minimum weight matching of the graph,
738 out of 1047 users correctly match which gives 70.5%
accuracy (refer to the last row of Table I under “Matching
K users”). The obtained accuracy is significantly higher that
that of the first experiment using 1154 users. This is because
we have more information available for matching the users,
namely, four days’ statistics instead of two days.
D. Experiment Three
We repeated the two previous experiments in the setting
in which we are given statistic of all users in the first week
and only of one user in the second week. The objective is
to match the user’s statistics from the second week to the
correct statistics from the first week. This corresponds to the
case in which set S2 described in Section II is a singleton,
which also corresponds to the setting addressed by Gutman
in [3]. We proceed as follows.
We first generalize experiment one to this setting. We let
S1 be the collection of traces of all users on the Monday of
the first week as in Section IV-B. For S2 we use the trace of
a randomly selected user on the Monday of the second week.
Let Γyj denote the empirical distribution of this trace. We
match this trace to the trace xi from the first week that gives
the minimum value of the weight computed in (7). If there
exist ties (i.e., multiple users in S1 having minimum weight),
we break them randomly. This is exactly the algorithm
studied by Gutman [3]. We estimate the average probability
of correct matching under this procedure by computing the
fraction of choices of S2 that lead to correct matchings.
Following a similar approach, we also generalize experiment
two to this setting, i.e., when data from both Mondays and
Tuesdays are available in both weeks.
The obtained probabilities are shown in the last column of
Table I for the datasets used in experiments one and two. The
observed behavior is similar to that when all the K users are
matched: matching probability decreases when the number of
users increases, and increases when the available information
increases. We also observe that the obtained accuracy of
matching is lower than the accuracy obtained with the same
dataset when all the users are matched. This is expected
because in the latter case we have more data (set S2 is larger)
and thus we can do a better matching. This observation
has important implications in the perspective of privacy of
anonymized statistics. A user’s privacy depends not only on
how much her trajectory is revealed to the adversary, but
also on how much others’ trajectories are revealed to the
adversary.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied strategies for de-
anonymizing anonymized user statistics given auxiliary in-
formation about the user’s behavior. We obtained an asymp-
totically optimal strategy for this problem assuming an i.i.d.
model for the users’ data. We focussed primarily on the
setting in which auxiliary information about all the users
are available in the form of independent data strings of all
users. It may be possible to extend the optimality result to
the case where only auxiliary information about a subset
of the users are available, a special case of which was
studied by Gutman [3], where auxiliary information about
only one user is available. Similarly, although in this paper
we have assumed that the length of the data-strings in the
anonymized statistics and the auxiliary information are all
equal to n, the proposed solution and optimality result can
easily be generalized to the case where these are distinct,
following the same steps as in [3], provided that the length
of all data-strings are of equal order. We also saw the
performance obtained with the proposed algorithm on real
mobility traces recorded on two different days. We saw that
de-anonymization can be performed with higher accuracy
if traces about all users are available on the second day,
as against having information only about a single user.
One aspect that we did not consider in the location de-
anonymization is that the geometric distance between various
locations may be available. In practice, it may be possible
to perform better matching by taking this information into
account, although obtaining optimality results may be hard.
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APPENDIX
We need the following lemma for the proofs. Recall that
for any string s ∈ Zn we use Ts to denote the type class of s,
i.e., the set of all strings of length n with the same empirical
distribution as s. The following lemma is well known (see
e.g., [13, Ch. 12]).
Lemma 1.1: For every p ∈ P(Z) and every s ∈ Zn,
1
(n+ 1)|Z|
2−nD(Γs‖p) ≤ Pp(Ts) ≤ 2
−nD(Γs‖p)
where Pp denotes the probability measure when all observa-
tions in s are drawn i.i.d. according to law p. ⊓⊔
A. Proof of Lemma 3.2
Consider an arbitrary tuplet of sequences
(x1, x2, . . . , xK , y1, y2, . . . , yK). Let T =
(Tx1 , . . . , TxK , Ty1 , . . . , TyK ) denote the joint type-class of
all the sequences. Any (x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
K , y
′
1, y
′
2, . . . , y
′
K) ∈ T
belongs to exactly one of the sets Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,ΩM ,ΩR. We
modify the decision rule Ω as follows. For any type T we
let Λi include T if Ωi contains the most number of the
sequences of T , for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M,R}. In case of ties we
break them arbitrarily and include T in exactly one of the
Λi’s.
By construction we have for any type T ⊂ ΛR
|ΩR| ≥
1
M + 1
|T |.
Moreover, we have
|ΛR| =
∑
T⊂ΛR
|T |
≤
∑
T⊂ΛR
(M + 1)|ΩR|
≤ |ΩR|(1 + (M + 1)τn)
where τn represents the number of types of length n. Since
log τn
n
→ 0 [13] we have (9).
Now for any type T ⊂ Λi with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} we have
by Lemma 1.1 and definition of Λi:
PHi{Ωi} ≥ PHi{Ωi ∩ T } ≥
1
M + 1
PHi{T }
≥
2
−n
∑K
k=1
(
D(Γxpii(k)
‖pk)+D(Γyk‖pk)+δ(n)
)
M + 1
where δ(n) = 2|Z| log(n+1)
n
. Combining the above result
along with the definition of Λi and Lemma 1.1, we have
PHi{Λi} =
∑
T⊂Λi
PHi{T }
≤
∑
T⊂Λi
2
−n
∑
K
k=1
(
D(Γxpii(k)
‖pk)+D(Γyk‖pk)
)
≤
∑
T⊂Λi
2nδ(n)(M + 1)PHi{Ωi}
≤ τn2
nδ(n)(M + 1)PHi{Ωi}
Since log τn
n
→ 0 [13] we have (8).
B. Proof of Theorem 3.3
Define
Λ˜i = {ΓXY : D(Hi) ≥ λ˜}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
Clearly,
Λj ⊂ Λ˜i for all j 6= i
and hence
∪j 6=iΛj ⊂ ∪j 6=i
(
∩k 6=jΛ˜k
)
⊂ Λ˜i.
Therefore,
PΛ(e/Hi) =
∑
∪j 6=iΛj
K∏
k=1
pk(xpii(k))pk(yk)
≤
∑
Λ˜i
K∏
k=1
pk(xpii(k))pk(yk)
(a)
≤
∑
Λ˜i
K∏
k=1
2
−2nH( 1
2
(Γxpii(k)
+Γyk ))
=
∑
Λ˜i
2
−2n
∑K
k=1H(
1
2
(Γxpii(k)
+Γyk ))
=
∑
Λ˜i
2
−n
∑
K
k=1
(
H(Γxpii(k)
)+H(Γyk )+
D(Γxpii(k)
‖ 1
2
(Γxpii(k)
+Γyk ))+
D(Γyk‖
1
2
(Γxpii(k)
+Γyk ))
)
≤
∑
Λ˜i
2
−n
∑K
k=1
(
H(Γxpii(k)
)+H(Γyk )+λ˜
)
≤ 2−nλ˜
∑
Z
2
−n
∑
K
k=1
(
H(Γxpii(k)
)+H(Γyk )
)
≤ 2−nλ˜
where (a) follows from the inequality p(s) ≤ 2−nH(Γs) for
all p. This proves (12). For proving (13) we observe that for
any test based on empirical distributions, we have
2−λn ≥ PΩ(e/Hi)
=
∑
∪j 6=iΩj
K∏
k=1
pk(xpii(k))pk(yk)
(a)
≥
∑
T⊂∪j 6=iΩj
2
−n
∑K
k=1
(
D(Γxpii(k)
‖pk)+
D(Γyk‖pk)+δ(n))
≥ 2
−n
∑
K
k=1
(
D(Γx′
pii(k)
‖pk)+D(Γy′
k
‖pk)+δ(n)
)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1.1 with T =
(Tx1 , . . . , TxK , Ty1 , . . . , TyK ) and δ(n) =
2|Z| log(n+1)
n
,
and (x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
K , y
′
1, y
′
2, . . . , y
′
K) ∈ ∪j 6=iΩj and
p1, p2, . . . , pK ∈ P(Z) is arbitrary. Now letting
pk =
1
2 (Γx′pii(k)
+ Γy′
k
) we get
λ ≤
K∑
k=1
(
D(Γx′
pii(k)
‖ 12 (Γx′pii(k)
+ Γy′
k
))+
D(Γy′
k
‖ 12 (Γx′pii(k)
+ Γy′
k
)) + δ(n)
)
which further implies that
∪j 6=iΩj ⊂ Λ˜i. (14)
Now let
Λ̂i := ∩j 6=iΛ˜j .
Hence,
∪iΛi = {ΓXY : D(H˜) ≥ λ˜} = ∪iΛ̂i.
Combining with (14) we get
Λ̂i = ∩j 6=iΛ˜j ⊃ ∩j 6=i ∪k 6=j Ωk ⊃ Ωi
and thus
ΛcR = ∪iΛi = ∪iΛ̂i ⊃ ∪iΩi = Ω
c
R.
Hence
ΛR ⊂ ΩR.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust de-anonymization of
large sparse datasets,” in Proc. 2008 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, Washington, DC, USA. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2008.33
[2] Y.-A. de Montjoye, C. A. Hidalgo, M. Verleysen, and V. D.
Blondel, “Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human
mobility,” Scientific Reports, vol. 3, Mar. 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep01376
[3] M. Gutman, “Asymptotically optimal classification for multiple tests
with empirically observed statistics,” IEEE Transactions on Informa-
tion Theory, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 401–408, 1989.
[4] L. Sweeney, “Weaving technology and policy together to maintain
confidentiality,” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, vol. 25, no.
2-3, pp. 98–110, 1997.
[5] X. Xiao, Y. Zheng, Q. Luo, and X. Xie, “Finding similar users
using category-based location history,” in Proceedings of the 18th
SIGSPATIAL International Conference on Advances in Geographic
Information Systems. ACM, 2010, pp. 442–445.
[6] C. Y. Ma, D. K. Yau, N. K. Yip, and N. S. Rao, “Privacy vulnerability
of published anonymous mobility traces,” in Proceedings of the
sixteenth annual international conference on Mobile computing and
networking. ACM, 2010, pp. 185–196.
[7] J. Freudiger, R. Shokri, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Evaluating the privacy
risk of location-based services,” in Financial Cryptography and Data
Security. Springer, 2012, pp. 31–46.
[8] S. Gambs, M.-O. Killijian, and M. Nunez Del Prado Cortez,
“De-anonymization attack on geolocated datasets,” in Proceedings
of the The 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security
and Privacy in Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-
13), Melbourne, Australie, Jul. 2013, p. 9p. [Online]. Available:
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00718763
[9] Y. De Mulder, G. Danezis, L. Batina, and B. Preneel, “Identification
via location-profiling in gsm networks,” in Proceedings of the 7th
ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society. ACM, 2008,
pp. 23–32.
[10] H. Zang and J. Bolot, “Anonymization of location data does not work:
A large-scale measurement study,” in Proceedings of the 17th annual
international conference on Mobile computing and networking. ACM,
2011, pp. 145–156.
[11] M. Srivatsa and M. Hicks, “Deanonymizing mobility traces: Using
social network as a side-channel,” in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
conference on Computer and communications security. ACM, 2012,
pp. 628–637.
[12] D. B. West et al., Introduction to graph theory. Prentice hall
Englewood Cliffs, 2001, vol. 2.
[13] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory 2nd
Edition (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing).
Wiley-Interscience, July 2006.
